On Accountability in a Community of Practice

Dourish points to tangible computing and social computing as two examples that show a concern for embodied interaction. Of the two, tangible computing may be the more obvious as it focuses on how our interactions can be embedded in physical reality. But his inclusion of social computing is important because it demonstrates that embodiment is not just about physical manifestations, but also concerns social context and the way interaction is developed over time among a community of practice.

Practice implies not only the detail of what people actually do, but also that the action fits into a wider scheme of ongoing activity that makes it meaningful. Further, it implies that action is situated within a community of practice, which provides its members with a set of common orientations and expectations, fluid but persistent over time. (p.161)

As background, Dourish gives a brief sketch of ethnomethodology, a concept originated by sociologist Harold Garfinkel in the 1960s. While ethnomethodology is not a popular idea in traditional sociology, he points to its influence in the study of human-computer interaction (HCI) and computer supported cooperative work (CSCW) via Lucy Suchman’s work on situated action in the 80s.

The relevance of Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology for embodiment is in the way it characterizes members of communities as meaning makers, rather than as passive vessels of abstract social laws (as it is understood in traditional sociology)

Garfinkel uses the term “cultural dope” to describe the actor as theorized by conventional sociology, blindly acting in accordance with a set of social rules of which he remains unaware. Critically, though, ethnomethodology observes that people do have reasons for acting the way they do. They continually operate according to explicable mechanisms by which they regulate and organize their action and understand the action of others… In other words, in the course of everyday life, everyone, always, is engaged in “practical sociological reasoning,” when as part and parcel of what they do, they have to figure out what other people mean and in turn figure out how to act themselves in order to get things done. (p.75)

So, when we consider how technology participates in these communities of practice, we cannot disregard the importance of how members of those communities choose to take action. “Accountability” is the word Dourish draws from ethnomethodology to mean the way action is available and understandable in context among members of a particular community of practice.

The analytic concept of accountability emphasizes that the organization of action, as it arises in situ, provides other with the means to understand what it is and how to respond in a mutually constructed sequence of action. (p.80)

Technical solutions, following a principle of abstraction, often only focus on the result of activities without respecting the accountability between people needed to achieve it. In addition, technology, as participants in the interaction, need to provide available and understandable accounts of their own actions.

It’s worth noting that Dourish’s goal in presenting ethnomethodology is distinct from simply indicating the need for ethnographic investigation as part of design. Yes, we can use ethnographic methods to better understand a particular activity and turn that into a design. But Dourish wants the reader to consider ethnomethodological analysis as a possibility for a deeper shift that connects sociological understanding to the foundations of technological design. Accountability versus abstraction is just one instance of this shift.